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In Support of UREAA: The Case for
Timely, Uniform, and Comprehensive
Action Against Restrictive Employment
Agreements
Ryan Greenberg
Tens of millions of American workers across a range of
occupations are bound by restrictive employment agreements. The
COVID-19 pandemic has caused people to leave their jobs in
search of more money, flexibility, and happiness—deemed the
Great Resignation—shining a new light on the volatility of labor
markets. But restrictive employment agreements limit workers’
exit options and stymie competition, in tension with our nation’s
antitrust laws. The effects of these agreements are particularly
damaging to low-wage workers. Rightfully so, policymakers
across jurisdictions and political ideologies are increasingly
introducing measures to curtail the abuse of these agreements.
This area of the law would benefit from timely, uniform, and
comprehensive reform. The Uniform Restrictive Employment
Agreement Act (“UREAA”) has emerged as a forward-thinking
piece of legislation that seeks to unify the current patchwork of
state laws targeting various renditions of restrictive employment
agreements. Every state should adopt UREAA, and the federal
government should join their surging fight against restrictive
employment agreements.
This Note expresses the state of the law as it exists on August 1,
2022. Part I ushers in the concept of labor mobility and its
particular importance to low-wage workers. Part II explains how
current events are influencing workers’ changing attitudes
towards their jobs, spotlighting the need for labor mobility. Part
III introduces a widespread barrier to labor mobility—restrictive
employment agreements, which function as restraints of trade.
Part IV presents the role of antitrust as a safeguard against
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unreasonable restraints of trade. Part V synthesizes common
arguments for and against restrictive employment agreements as
unreasonable restraints of trade, exploring the changing
landscape of restrictive employment agreement laws, as
jurisdictions re-examine their usefulness and fairness. Part VI
presents this author’s view that action against restrictive
employment agreements should be timely, uniform, and
comprehensive. Part VII encourages states to adopt UREAA in
consideration of these metrics, while also acknowledging the
Act’s limitations and highlighting areas in which the federal
government can contribute. Part VIII concludes by providing a
model for multilevel enforcement of restrictive employment
agreement laws.
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I. A PRIMER ON LABOR MOBILITY
Labor mobility refers to the degree to which workers are able and
willing to move from one job to another, or from one area to another, to
work. 1 Labor mobility is important for workers and employers alike.2
Labor mobility allows workers whose aspirations or skills are a poor match
for their job or location to improve their economic circumstances and
quality of life, empowering them to find the best possible employment fit
and providing employers with a large pool from which to recruit the best
possible employees. 3 Unremarkably, employees who improve their
financial and personal situations are more likely to be happy and
productive at work. 4
Movement that occurs across occupations is known as occupational
mobility. 5 Ease of occupational mobility allows workers to leverage their
existing skills to move into higher-paying roles with more growth
opportunities. 6 Occupational mobility can be restricted through
regulations, licensing, training, or education requirements that prevent the
free flow of labor from one industry to another. 7 Movement that occurs
across physical space is known as geographic mobility. 8 Ease of
geographic mobility allows workers to seek out opportunities in new

1
See Labour Mobility, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/
dictionary/english/labour-mobility.
2
See Brent Radcliffe, The Economics of Labor Mobility, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 30,
2022), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/09/labor-mobility.asp.
3
Jason Long & Joseph Ferrie, “Labour Mobility”, OXFORD ENCYC. OF ECON. HISTORY
1, 1 (2006), https://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~fe2r/papers/Labour%20Mobility.pdf;
Jacqueline A. Carosa, Employee Mobility and the Low Wage Worker: The Illegitimate Use
of Non-Compete Agreements, 67 DOCKET D1, D7 (2019).
4
See generally Radcliffe, supra note 2.
5
Long & Ferrie, supra note 3, at 1.
6
Helen Thompson, Workers Gain New Tool to Locate More-Lucrative Jobs, ESRI
(Mar. 2, 2021), https://www.esri.com/about/newsroom/publications/wherenext/workersgain-new-tool-to-locate-more-lucrative-jobs/.
7
Adam Hayes, Occupational Labor Mobility, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 16, 2021), https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/o/occupational-labor-mobility.asp.
8
Id.
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markets. 9 Geographic mobility can be restricted through physical,
geographic, and political barriers to movement. 10
Labor mobility is of heightened importance for low-wage workers. 11
A low-wage worker might be eager to change jobs for a more favorable
work schedule or a small increase in compensation or benefits, as
compared to a high-wage worker who is less apt to start over with a new
employer. 12 Many low-wage workers, such as those with substantial debt,
value the ability to move from one job to another without restraint. 13

II. INTERRELATED ECONOMIC CHALLENGES HIGHLIGHT THE NEED
FOR LABOR MOBILITY
In April 2021, 3.8 million American workers quit their jobs, a recordhigh for a single month. 14 By July 2021, the U.S. economy reached just
over four million quits. 15 Monthly quit numbers have not dipped below the
four-million mark since, reaching a new record-high of 4.53 million in
March 2022, followed by 4.4 million in April and 4.3 million in May. 16
Over a year into the phenomena, the “Great Resignation” shows little sign
of slowing and may persist. 17
Clay Halton, Geographical Labor Mobility, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 15, 2022), https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/g/geographical-mobility-of-labor.asp; see Thompson, supra
note 6.
10
Halton, supra note 9.
11
Carosa, supra note 3, at D34.
12
Id.; Todd Gabe et al., Can Low-Wage Workers Find Better Jobs?, FED. RSRV. BANK
OF N.Y. 1, 18 (Apr. 2018), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff
_reports/sr846.pdf.
13
See Carosa, supra note 3, at D34.
14
Stephanie Horan, A Record 3.8 Million Workers Quit Their Jobs in April 2021: Who
Are They?, YAHOO! (Jul. 22, 2021), https://www.yahoo.com/now/record-3-8-millionworkers-110039995.html.
15
Rebecca Klapper, Nearly 4 Million Americans Quit Jobs in July, Second Highest
Record, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 8, 2021), https://www.newsweek.com/nearly-4-millionamericans-quit-jobs-july-second-highest-record-1627160.
16
Id.; Thomas Ahearn, “Great Resignation” Sees Record 4.5 Million Workers Quit in
March 2022, ESRCHECK (May 3, 2022), https://www.esrcheck.com/2022/05/03/greatresignation-4-5-million-workers-quit-march-2022/.
17
Cagan Koc, Great Resignation Isn’t Slowing and May Persist, Randstad Says,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 3, 2022), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-03/greatresignation-isn-t-slowing-and-may-persist-randstad-says; see Diana Zoga, What Do
Workers Want as The ‘Great Resignation’ Continues?, NBCDFW (June 13, 2022),
https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/nbc-5-responds/what-do-workers-want-as-the-greatresignation-continues/2991181/. But see Pablo Fernandez Cras & Cagan Koc, Great
Resignation is Slowing Amid High Inflation, Randstad Says, BLOOMBERG (July 26, 2022),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-26/great-resignation-is-slowingamid-high-inflation-randstad-says.
9
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Though employee turnover has steadily risen for the past decade,
individuals often point to the novel COVID-19 pandemic as a dominant
force in their decision to resign. 18 Americans, stuck at home due to local
shut-downs or remote work policies, are rethinking what work means to
them, how they are valued, and how they spend their time. 19 They are
leaving their current work arrangements in search of more money, more
flexibility, and more happiness. 20 Robert Reich, former U.S. Secretary of
Labor, put it bluntly: “[Employees] don’t want to return to backbreaking
or boring, low wage, sh-t jobs. Workers are burned out. They’re fed up.
They’re fried. In the wake of so much hardship, and illness and death
during the past year, they’re not going to take it anymore.” 21
Workers are seeking out companies with better company culture,
including flexible work arrangements and a healthy work-life balance. 22
The pandemic has amplified Americans’ existing concerns about their lack
of career progression and skills development. 23 Furthermore, laborers now
place a higher value on employer-provided benefits such as retirement
plans; health, disability, and life insurance; paid family medical leave; and
emergency savings programs. 24
Many of us, not just those in the workforce, remain wary about the
next variant, undoubtedly affecting our productivity and attitudes about
our work situations. 25 In May 2022, the U.S. death toll from the pandemic
reached one million individuals. 26 However, COVID-19 is far from the
only factor driving workforce behavior. 27 The Great Resignation has in
turn led to a labor shortage, and these interrelated challenges are wreaking
18
See Ian O. Williamson, The “Great Resignation” Is a Trend That Began Before the
Pandemic – and Bosses Need to Get Used to it, BIG THINK (Nov. 16, 2021),
https://bigthink.com/the-present/the-great-resignation/; Phillip Kane, The Great
Resignation is Here, and It’s Real, INC. (Aug. 26, 2021), https://www.inc.com/phillip-kane
/the-great-resignation-is-here-its-real.html.
19
See Andrea Hsu, As the Pandemic Recedes, Millions of Workers Are Saying ‘I Quit’,
NPR (June 24, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/06/24/1007914455/as-the-pandemicrecedes-millions-of-workers-are-saying-i-quit; Kane, supra note 18.
20
Hsu, supra note 19.
21
Abby Vesoulis, Why Literally Millions of Americans Are Quitting Their Jobs, TIME
(Oct. 13, 2021), https://time.com/6106322/the-great-resignation-jobs/.
22
Caroline Castrillon, Why Millions of Employees Plan to Switch Jobs Post-Pandemic,
FORBES (May 16, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/carolinecastrillon/2021/05/16/whymillions-of-employees-plan-to-switch-jobs-post-covid/?sh=1b42bc6d11e7.
23
See id.
24
See id.
25
See Vesoulis, supra note 21.
26
Carla K. Johnson, US Deaths from COVID Hit 1 Million, Less Than 2 1/2 Years in,
AP NEWS (May 16, 2022), https://apnews.com/article/us-covid-death-toll-one-million7cefbd8c3185fd970fd073386e442317.
27
Vesoulis, supra note 21.
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havoc on the U.S. job market, to the detriment of both employers and
employees. 28
The labor shortage, a natural consequence of the Great Resignation, is
itself an expression of widespread worker dissatisfaction. 29 Americans that
stayed put in jobs are grappling with increasing responsibility, creating a
greater risk of burnout and resignation. 30 Half of U.S. workers describe
their workplace as understaffed, and those workers are more likely to
report thoughts of quitting. 31 Workers perceive understaffed companies as
struggling enterprises, accelerating this desire. 32 This vicious job market
feedback loop has made it harder for employers to hire and retain
employees. 33 There’s also the issue of increasing prices that outpace wage
growth, on top of rising childcare costs that make work simply
unaffordable for some Americans. 34 Andrew Garin, an economics
professor at the University of Illinois, pointed to the construction industry
as one example of an industry whose labor shortage issue isn’t due to a
shortage of workers as much as its due to a shortage of workers at the
going rate. 35 Even though the labor shortage has forced companies to raise
wages at the fastest rate in decades, record inflation has swallowed up
workers’ gains, leaving most with less buying power than when the
pandemic started. 36
These economic challenges have accentuated the need for labor
mobility, especially among low-wage workers. 37 Front-line workers, tired
of customer mistreatment and concerned about exposure to COVID-19,
Eric Rosenbaum, A Vicious Job Market Feedback Loop is Making the Great
Resignation Even Worse — for Employers, CNBC (Nov. 5, 2021, 6:30 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/11/05/the-vicious-job-market-feedback-loop-making-greatresignation-worse.html.
29
See Abigail Susik, Could the Great Resignation Help Workers? Take a Look at
History., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/11/opinion/
great-resignation-labor-shortage.html.
30
See Vesoulis, supra note 21.
31
See Rosenbaum, supra note 28.
32
See id.
33
Id.
34
See id.; Vesoulis, supra note 21.
35
See Patrick Sisson, One Solution to a Shortage of Skilled Workers? Diversify the
Construction Industry., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/
25/business/dealbook/labor-shortage-diversity.html.
36
Ben Winck & Andy Kiersz, Inflation Has Been Historically High for Most of 2021.
But the Stars Are Aligning for Strong Wage Growth That Could Offset It., BUS. INSIDER
(Dec. 10, 2021, 1:05 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/labor-shortage-inflation-highwage-growth-outlook-cpi-november-prices-2021-12.
37
See Susan Lund et al., The Future of Work After COVID-19, MCKINSEY & CO. (Feb.
18, 2021), https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-of-work/the-future-ofwork-after-covid-19.
28
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have resigned at staggering rates. 38 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the greatest
increases in quit rates are occurring in sectors such as leisure and
hospitality, where office workers are few, working remotely is seldom an
option, and wages are low. 39 Much of the Great Resignation is, in effect,
a product of low-paid workers seeking higher-paying jobs. 40
Most workers view job-hopping as a strategic and beneficial career
strategy. 41 But what happens when an earlier employer seeks to limit a
former employee’s move? If the employee signed a restrictive
employment agreement, he or she may be legally obligated to comply with
the employer’s demand, to the detriment of the employee and the public at
large.

III. PERVASIVE BARRIERS TO LABOR MOBILITY: RESTRICTIVE
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS AS RESTRAINTS OF TRADE
Restrictive employee agreements prohibit or limit a worker from
working elsewhere after a work relationship ends. 42 Non-compete
agreements are the best-recognized flavor of restrictive employee
agreements, often considered the most restrictive. 43 Broadly, the term noncompete agreement refers to an agreement between an employer and an
employee that prohibits the employee from accepting employment in a
similar line of work or establishing a competing business following the
parties’ separation. 44 About one in every five American workers—nearly
See Áine Cain & Allana Akhtar, Burned Out Frontline Workers Are Seeking Out the
Lesser Evil in Their Job Searches, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 10, 2021, 8:05 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/burned-out-frontline-workers-lesser-evil-jobscustomers-harassment-2021-10; Megan Leonhardt, The Great Resignation is Hitting These
Industries Hardest, FORTUNE (Nov. 16, 2021, 2:39 PM), https://fortune.com/2021/11/16/
great-resignation-hitting-these-industries-hardest/.
39
Justin Fox, The Great Resignation is Great for Low-Paid Workers, BLOOMBERG (Nov.
18, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-11-18/the-greatresignation-is-great-for-low-paid-workers.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
UNIF. RESTR. EMP. AGR. ACT 1 (prefatory note) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021).
43
See id. 1 (prefatory note), § 2 cmt.; Stephen L. Brodsky, Restrictive Covenants in
Employment and Related Contracts: Key Considerations You Should Know, A.B.A. (Feb.
8,
2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/commercialbusiness/practice/2019/restrictive-covenants-employment-related-contracts/.
44
Sandeep Vaheesan & Matthew Jinoo Buck, Non-Competes and Other Contracts of
Dispossession, 2022 MICH. ST. L. REV. 113, 119 (Sandeep Vaheesan is the Legal Director
of Open Markets Institute and former counsel in the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau’s Office of Regulations. Matthew Jinoo Buck is a J.D. Candidate at Yale law school
and Senior Fellow at the American Economic Liberties Project, as well as a former policy
analyst at Economic Liberties and Open Markets Institute).
38
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thirty million people, across a wide range of occupations—are
contractually bound by non-compete agreements. 45
Other common varieties of employer-employee restrictive
employment agreements include non-solicitation agreements prohibiting
the solicitation of former customers; no-business agreements prohibiting
doing business with former customers; confidentiality or nondisclosure
agreements prohibiting the use or disclosure of trade secrets or other
confidential information; training-repayment agreements to pay back
training expenses if the employee leaves early; no-business agreements
prohibiting doing business with former customers; no-recruit agreements
prohibiting the recruitment or hiring of former co-workers; and paymentfor-competition agreements to pay the employer if the employee
competes, solicits, recruits, or does business. 46 On the other hand, nopoach agreements are employer-employer restrictive employment
agreements—deals made between competing employers not to hire or
pursue each other’s employees. 47
Restrictive employment agreements usually arise in the context of
employment or separation agreements. 48 Thus, these agreements may
appear as restrictive covenants within a larger contract. 49 Regardless of the
name given to it by the contracting parties or the context in which they
arise, restrictive employee agreements are typically reviewed under state
statutory or common law. 50 States vary widely in their treatment of
restrictive employee agreements.51 Some states impose few restrictions on

See id. at 120.
UNIF. RESTR. EMP. AGR. ACT 1 (prefatory note).
47
Kelly Anderson, DOJ Focus on No-Poach Cases Could Have Wide-Ranging
Consequences for Managers, SHRM (Aug. 11, 2021), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesand
tools/hr-topics/people-managers/pages/no-poach-cases-.aspx.
48
Teresa Lewi et al., Recent Federal and State Laws Restrict Use of Employee NonCompetition Agreements by Government Contractors and Other Employers, INSIDE GOV’T
CONTS. (Aug. 19, 2021), https://www.insidegovernmentcontracts.com/2021/08/recentfederal-and-state-laws-restrict-use-of-employee-non-competition-agreements-bygovernment-contractors-and-other-employers/.
49
See Restrictive Covenants in Employment Contracts - Employer Liability, DORSEY &
WHITNEY LLP (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/
client-alerts/2020/04/restrictive-covenants-in-employment-contracts (“While restrictive
covenants are most commonly found in employment contracts, they may be included in
several other types of agreements.”).
50
See Antitrust Considerations in Employment Agreement Non-Compete Clauses,
PRACTICAL L. ANTITRUST, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/If28fc8b60fbe11e698dc
8b09b4f043e0/View/FullText.html?originationContext=knowHw&transitionType=Know
HowItem&contextData=(sc.DocLink)&isplcus=true&firstPage=true&bhcp=1 (last visited
Aug. 1, 2022).
51
See id.
45
46
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their use, while others ban certain agreements in most circumstances or
impose criminal penalties for employers who use them. 52
Fittingly, restrictive employment agreements are also known as
restraint of trade agreements, which prohibit the contracting party from
conducting his or her trade or business as he or she otherwise would in the
absence of the agreement. 53 For hundreds of years, restraints of trade were
considered unequivocally illegal. 54 Over time, exceptions to the general
rule developed, and courts began distinguishing between general and
limited restraints of trade. 55 General restraints of trade, such as agreements
that limited a party’s ability to accept employment or establish a
competing business indefinitely and without bounds, were still considered
unreasonable (illegal) and, thus, unenforceable. 56 In contrast, limited
restraints of trade, such as agreements that constrained a party’s ability to
accept employment or establish a competing business within a sensible
geographic area or within a sensible period of time, came to be considered
reasonable (legal) and thus enforceable. 57
The distinction between unreasonable and reasonable restraints of
trade persists today, though, as mentioned, the standard that restrictive
employment agreements are judged against differs across jurisdictions. 58
For example, in enforceable states, non-compete agreements must
generally be narrowly tailored to protect an employer’s legitimate business
interests, and this protection must be reasonable with respect to duration,
geographical scope, and the line of business restricted. 59 An agreement is
reasonable only if it (1) is no greater than is required for the protection of
the employer, (2) does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and
(3) is not injurious to the public. 60
52

See id.
See id.
54
See Alger v. Thacher, 36 Mass. 51, 52-53 (1837) (“Among the most ancient rules of
the common law, we find it laid down, that bonds in restraint of trade are void. As early as
the second year of Henry V. (A. D. 1415) we find by the Year Books, that this was
considered to be old and settled law.”); Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d
531, 539 (Wyo. 1993) (“The common law policy against contracts in restraint of trade is
one of the oldest and most firmly established.” (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 185–188, intro. note (AM. L. INST. 1981))), overruled by Hassler v. Circle
C Res., 505 P.3d 169 (Wyo. 2022).
55
Alger, 36 Mass. at 53.
56
See id.
57
Id.
58
See Brodsky, supra note 43.
59
Non-Competition Agreements: Overview, FINDLAW (Dec. 17, 2021),
https://www.findlaw.com/employment/hiring-process/non-competition-agreementsoverview.html.
60
Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 648–
49 (1960).
53
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IV. THE ROLE OF ANTITRUST: PREVENTING UNREASONABLE
RESTRAINTS OF TRADE
As restraints of trade, restrictive employee agreements may implicate
our nation’s antitrust laws. 61 Antitrust laws prohibit business practices that
unreasonably deprive Americans of the benefits of competition.62 A
competitive marketplace facilitates high-quality job creation and
empowers workers to switch jobs or negotiate a higher wage. 63 Aggressive
competition in an open marketplace gives consumers the benefits of lower
prices, higher quality products and services, more choices, and greater
innovation. 64 Competition also gives businesses the opportunity to
compete on legitimate merits such as price and quality. 65 Plainly, antitrust
laws protect the welfare of all Americans, including American workers. 66
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 remains the principal federal law
expressing our nation’s commitment to a free market economy
unencumbered by anticompetitive restraints. 67 Section one of the Sherman
Act states that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 68 Courts
do not read the Sherman Act literally; the statute has been interpreted to
outlaw only unreasonable restraints of trade. 69 A literal reading of the
Sherman Act would smother our economy, since any contract can be said
to somewhat restrain trade. 70
However, certain acts are considered so anticompetitive that they are,
in every instance, deemed illegal. 71 Some agreements, such as plain
agreements among competitors to fix prices, rig bids, or divide markets,
are so repugnant to American antitrust ideals that they are considered per
se violations of the Sherman Act. 72 These types of agreements are so likely
PRACTICAL L. ANTITRUST, supra note 50.
Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 1, 1,
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/800691/download (last visited Aug. 1, 2022).
63
Exec. Order No. 14,036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36987 (July 9, 2021).
64
Guide to Antitrust Laws, F.T.C., https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws (last visited Aug. 1, 2022).
65
Mission, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (July 20, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/mission.
66
Joint Antitrust Statement Regarding COVID-19 and Competition in Labor Markets,
U.S DEP’T OF JUST. & F.T.C. 1, 2 (Apr. 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/1268506/download.
67
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 62, at 2.
68
15 U.S.C. § 1.
69
The Antitrust Laws, F.T.C., https://www.ftc.gov/advice-guidance/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Aug. 1, 2022).
70
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 62, at 2.
71
F.T.C., supra note 69.
72
Id.
61
62

2022]

IN SUPPORT OF UREAA

129

to be harmful to competition and to have no significant benefits that they
do not warrant the time and expense required for particularized inquiry
into their effects. 73
Agreements that have not been deemed per se illegal are analyzed
under the rule of reason. 74 Restrictive employee agreements are typically
reviewed under this standard. 75 The rule of reason focuses on the state of
competition in the relevant market before and after an agreement was
undertaken. 76 Courts assess whether the agreement likely harms (or
harmed) competition by (1) increasing the ability or incentive of a firm to
profitably raise prices above; or (2) reducing output, quality, service, or
innovation below what would likely prevail in the absence of the
agreement. 77 If the rule of reason analysis is sufficient to raise a
presumption of anticompetitive harm, defendants have an opportunity to
rebut the presumption by showing that the agreement is reasonably
necessary to achieve procompetitive benefits that likely offset the harm.78
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice
(DOJ) are the main entities tasked with enforcing federal antitrust law. 79
The FTC may bring civil enforcement actions, while the DOJ may bring
both civil and criminal actions. 80 Additionally, private parties—a phrase
that includes individuals corporations, and states—are incentivized bring
antitrust claims by the prospects of recovering treble damages, including
costs and attorney’s fees. 81
Most states themselves have antitrust laws that mirror the federal
antitrust laws. 82 These laws generally apply to violations that occur wholly
in one state and are typically enforced through the offices of state attorneys
Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, F.T.C. & U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST. 1, 3 (Apr. 2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/
joint-venture-hearings-antitrust-guidelines-collaboration-among-competitors/ftcdoj
guidelines-2.pdf.
74
Id.
75
J. Mark Gidley et al., Analysis: FTC Encouraged to Ban or Limit Non-Compete
Agreements in July 9, 2021 Executive Order, WHITE & CASE (July 19, 2021), https://
www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/analysis-ftc-encouraged-ban-or-limit-noncompete-agreements-july-9-2021.
76
F.T.C. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 73, at 4.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 62, at 3.
80
Id.; see The Enforcers, F.T.C. (last visited Aug. 1, 2022) https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/enforcers (“The FTC . . . may refer
evidence of criminal antitrust violations to the DOJ. Only the DOJ can obtain criminal
sanctions.”).
81
Kenneth Ewing, Private Anti-Trust Remedies Under US Law, PRACTICAL L. CO.
(2006/07), https://www.steptoe.com/images/content/1/7/v1/1731/2804.pdf.
82
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 62, at 3.
73
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general. 83 State attorneys general may also bring federal antitrust suits on
behalf of individuals residing within their states (“parens patriae” suits),
or on behalf of the state as a purchaser. 84

V. ARE RESTRICTIVE EMPLOYMENTS AGREEMENTS UNREASONABLE
RESTRAINTS OF TRADE?
Those in favor of restrictive employee agreements argue that they are
necessary to protect an employer’s intangible property such as trade
secrets, customer lists, and employee training. 85 These agreements protect
employers from employees who might otherwise misuse confidential
information or exercise special influence over customers. 86 Without
restrictive employment agreements, an employee or subsequent employer
can “free ride” on a prior employer’s investments in intangible property. 87
A employee bound by a restrictive employment agreement benefits by his
or her greater importance to the organization as a result of exposure to
trade secrets, customer lists, or special training.88 In this way, a welldrafted restrictive employment agreement “preserves a careful and
necessary economic balance.” 89 Another argument is that restrictive
employee agreements reduce employee turnover by matching companies
and employees who both seek out long-term working relationships. 90
Others maintain that the parties’ freedom to contract is an overriding
consideration. 91
Critics of restrictive employee agreements posit that they are
ineffective tools for protecting trade secrets and other employer
investments. 92 Other bodies of law, such as trade secret law and
intellectual property law, serve the same function more effectively.93 And
83

Id.
F.T.C., supra note 80.
85
See Vaheesan & Buck, supra note 44, at 117; Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc.,
861 P.2d 531, 546 (Wyo. 1993) (“Both the employer and the employee invest in success
by expressing a commitment to one another in the form of a reasonable covenant not to
compete. For the employer, this commitment may mean providing the employee with
access to trade secrets, customer contacts or special training. These assets of the business
are entitled to protection.”).
86
See Hopper, 861 P.2d at 546.
87
See Vaheesan & Buck, supra note 44, at 158.
88
Hopper, 861 P.2d at 546.
89
Id.
90
What is a Non-Competition Agreement?, CONTS. COUNS., https://www.contracts
counsel.com/t/us/non-competition-agreement (last visited Aug. 1, 2022).
91
See Brodsky, supra note 43.
92
See Vaheesan & Buck, supra note 44, at 159.
93
Id. at 46-49.
84
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the use of nonlegal measures—such as offering stock options, better terms
of employment, and higher wages and benefits—are superior to the use of
restrictive employee agreements. 94 With long-term stable employment no
longer the dominant model, employees should be able to take their services
to a an employer who offers greater opportunities. 95
Workers bound by restrictive employee agreements are restricted from
utilizing their full set of experiences, knowledge, and skills, reducing labor
mobility. 96 Most dissatisfied workers bound by a restrictive covenant are
limited to three socially undesirable outcomes: (1) staying with their
current employer; (2) finding employment in a line of work or an area that
is outside the scope of the covenant; or (3) accepting unemployment until
the covenant expires. 97 Restrictive employment agreements may compel
workers to stay in a job where they are subject to gender or racial
discrimination, sexual harassment, or other forms of mistreatment and
health threats. 98
Restrictive employment agreements unfairly affect labor market
competition. 99 By limiting competition for workers among employers,
restrictive employment agreements negatively affect wages and employee
welfare. 100 Because bound workers are unable to leverage any increase in
marketability into a better position elsewhere, restrictive employee
agreements discourage them from seeking out self-training and other
forms of self-improvement in their current roles. 101 Workers who switch
jobs are more likely to leave their industry if they are covered by a noncompete. 102 These workers may be faced with reduced compensation,
atrophy of their skills, and estrangement from their professional
networks. 103 In states where non-compete agreements are enforceable,
there are both reduced labor movement and wages for all workers, not just
See id. at 50-51.
MARION G. CRAIN ET AL., WORK LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 303-04 (4th ed. 2020).
96
See Vaheesan & Buck, supra note 44, at 158-59.
97
Id. at 26.
98
Id.
99
See Evan Starr, The Ties that Bind Workers to Firms: No-Poach Agreements,
Noncompetes, and Other Ways Firms Create and Exercise Labor Market Power,
PROMARKET (Jan. 3, 2022), https://promarket.org/2022/01/03/workers-poachingnoncompete-employers-labor-antitrust/ (Evan Starr is an author and an Associate Professor
of Management & Organization at the Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of
Maryland).
100
See Vaheesan & Buck, supra note 44, at 141; Evan Starr et al., Noncompete
Agreements in the U.S. Labor Force, 64 J.L. & ECON. 53, 55 (2021).
101
See Vaheesan & Buck, supra note 44, at 162.
102
Non-Compete Contracts: Economic Effects and Policy Implications, U.S. DEP’T OF
TREAS. 1, 18 (Mar. 2016), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/226/Non_Compete_
Contracts_Econimic_Effects_and_Policy_Implications_MAR2016.pdf.
103
Id.
94
95
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those bound by non-competes. 104 These negative effects spill over to entire
industries and neighboring states. 105
Moreover, restrictive employment agreements unfairly affect product
market competition. 106 They constrict information flow between
competitors and preempt future competition from departing employees.107
If a substantial portion of an industry’s workforce is covered by a noncompete, it discourages new firms from entering the market, lessening
product market competition, increasing prices, and reducing consumer
welfare. 108
Employers increasingly use restrictive employment agreements to
restrain lesser skilled, low-wage employees, limiting their mobility and
access to higher-paying jobs. 109 Those who push restrictive employment
agreements on low-wage workers cannot plausibly have a legitimate
business reason for doing so, as these employees are unlikely to possess
confidential information or special skills.110
Thankfully, large companies’ use of broad and abusive restrictive
employee agreements has received considerable attention in recent
years. 111 In 2014, former employees of Jimmy John’s sued the company
for using overbroad non-compete agreements that tremendously restricted
its sandwich shop employees’ post-employment options. 112 U.S. Congress
members called for a federal investigation into the company. 113 Amazon
noticed all of the heat Jimmy John’s was taking and wisely stopped
Starr, supra note 99.
Id.; Orly Lobel, Should Noncompete Clauses for Executives Be Legal? No: They
Reduce Wages and Job Mobility, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2021, 3:00 PM), https://www.
wsj.com/articles/non-compete-clause-legal-11632244492.
106
Starr, supra note 99.
107
Starr et al., supra note 100, at 55.
108
See id.; Orly Lobel, Boilerplate Collusion: Clause Aggregation, Antitrust Law &
Contract Governance, 106 MINN. L. REV. 877, 909 (2021).
109
UNIF. RESTR. EMP. AGR. ACT 2 (prefatory note); Michael Lipsitz & Evan Starr, LowWage Workers and the Enforceability of Non-Compete Agreements, MGMT. SCI. 1, 6 (Oct.
19, 2020) (“[W]hen workers do not fully understand their employment contract or have a
limited ability to negotiate for higher pay to compensate them for lost (future) mobility,
NCAs [non-compete agreements] may reduce worker earnings while also limiting
mobility.”).
110
See Carosa, supra note 3, at D6; see Lobel, supra note 108, at 913.
111
UNIF. RESTR. EMP. AGR. ACT 3-4 (prefatory note); Lipsitz & Starr, supra note 109, at
1.
112
Alissa Wickham, Reps. Seek Probe of Jimmy John’s Over Noncompetes, LAW360
(Oct. 23, 2014, 1:54 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/589575/reps-seek-probe-ofjimmy-john-s-over-noncompetes (“The agreements . . . bar employees from working at
any sandwich-serving restaurant within three miles of a Jimmy John’s location while
employed by the company, or for two years after they’ve left their Jimmy John’s
position.”).
113
Id.
104
105
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requiring its U.S. employees to sign broad non-competes in 2015. 114 A
year later, Jimmy John’s finally agreed to stop using the non-compete
agreements after the Attorneys General of New York and Illinois brought
parens patriae suits. 115 New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman
said the agreements had “no legitimate business interest” and “limit[ed]
mobility and opportunity for vulnerable workers and bull[ied] them into
staying with the threat of being sued.” 116 Media attention has prompted a
public backlash so severe that at least fifteen other franchises voluntarily
eliminated non-compete and no-poach agreements from their employment
contracts. 117
This is significant because, generally, employees are unlikely to
challenge the validity of restrictive employment agreements.118 Workers
in need of employment will consent to almost any restrictive employment
agreement. 119 They will assume the agreement is valid and comply with
its restrictions. 120 This is likely to be particularly true of low-wage workers
who do not have the resources to consult an attorney, nor the incentive to
risk legal action. 121 Those brave enough to engage are likely sufficiently
chilled when served with a cease and desist letter or pressured into
negotiating a settlement with their employer, even if the agreement is not
legally enforceable. 122 Should a challenge be brought in a blue-pencil
See Jana Kasperkevic, Amazon Removes Crazy Non-Compete Clause from Hourly
Workers’ Contracts, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 29, 2015, 10:42 AM), https://www.business
insider.com/amazon-removes-non-compete-clause-for-hourly-workers-2015-3 (“Amazon
has required its US employees, including seasonal workers, to sign non-compete contracts
which cover a period of more than 18 months after the employee has separated with the
company.”).
115
See Daniel Wiessner, Jimmy John’s Settles Illinois Lawsuit Over Non-Compete
Agreements, REUTERS (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-jimmyjohnssettlement-idUSKBN13W2JA.
116
Aruna Viswanatha, Sandwich Chain Jimmy John’s to Drop Noncompete Clauses from
Hiring Packets, WALL ST. J. (June 21, 2016, 9:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
sandwich-chain-jimmy-johns-to-drop-noncompete-clauses-from-hiring-packets1466557202.
117
See Evan Starr, The Use, Abuse, and Enforceability of Non-Compete and No-Poach
Agreements, ECON. INNOV. GRP. 1, 3 (Feb. 2019), https://eig.org/wp-content/uploads/
2019/02/Non-Competes-2.20.19.pdf; Rachel Abrams, 8 Fast-Food Chains Will End ‘NoPoach’ Policies, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/20/
business/fast-food-wages-no-poach-franchisees.html; Rachel Abrams, 7 Fast-Food
Chains to End ‘No Poach’ Deals That Lock Down Low-Wage Workers, N.Y. TIMES (July
12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/business/fast-food-wages-no-poach-deal
.html.
118
See CRAIN ET AL., supra note 95, at 101; Carosa, supra note 3, at D26.
119
Star Direct, Inc. v. Dal Pra, 767 N.W.2d 898, 924 n.10 (Wis. 2009) (Abrahamson C.J.,
dissenting).
120
CRAIN ET AL., supra note 95, at 301.
121
Id. at 101; Carosa, supra note 3, at D26; see Lipsitz & Starr, supra note 109, at 2.
122
Carosa, supra note 3, at D26.
114
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jurisdiction (whereby judges strike out the offensive provisions of the
contract) or a purple-pencil or reformation jurisdiction (whereby judges
revise an unenforceable agreement), employers can rest easy knowing that
the court will uphold the restrictions to the fullest extent possible. 123 In
red-pencil jurisdictions, the court will simply throw out the unenforceable
agreement. 124
Many workers are asked to sign a non-compete agreement only after
accepting their job offer. 125 These workers tend to be less satisfied,
compensated, and likely to receive training benefits. 126 “Employers
generally present [non-competes] to workers as standard form documents
on a take it-or-leave it basis, not subject to negotiation.” 127 Thus, the
timing of restrictive employment agreements can detrimentally affect an
employee’s bargain position and wellbeing. 128 Sandeep Vaheesan and
Matthew Jinoo Buck refer to restrictive employment agreements and
alternative arrangements (such as mandatory arbitration clauses,
confessions of judgment, and unilateral modification clauses) as contracts
of adhesion and dispossession, established in an environment of “radical
inequality” between a corporation and a worker, consumer, or small
business. 129 The lacking case law involving challenges to the legitimacy
of non-competes brought by low-wage workers led Jacqueline A. Carosa
to categorize such agreements as nothing more than a “scare tactic” used
to control turnover and limit fair competition, rather than protect legitimate
business interests. 130
123
See Carosa, supra note 3, at D18; Streiff v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 348 N.W.2d
505, 509 (Wis. 1984) (“The objection to [reformation] . . . is that it tends to encourage
employers possessing bargaining power superior to that of the employees to insist upon
unreasonable and excessive restrictions, secure in the knowledge that the promise will be
upheld in part, if not in full.”) (internal citations omitted).
124
See UNIF. RESTR. EMP. AGR. ACT § 16 cmt.; see also Lobel, supra note 108, at 931 (“If
reformation is the norm, . . . ‘Employers would have no disincentive to use the broad,
illegal clauses if permitted to retreat to a narrow, lawful construction in the event of
litigation.’”) (quoting Kolani v. Gluska, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 257, 260 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)).
125
See U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., supra note 102, at 4; Hayes, supra note 7; Starr et al., supra
note 100, at 55.
126
See Carosa, supra note 3, at D31.
127
Vaheesan & Buck, supra note 44, at 116.
128
Carosa, supra note 3, at D31.
129
Vaheesan & Buck, supra note 44, at 114, 116, 118, 173.
130
Carosa, supra note 3, at D26, D37; see Starr et al., supra note 100, at 55 (“Employers
might even deploy noncompetes when they are entirely unenforceable . . . hoping . . . that
the in terrorem effects of the contract will hold employees to their (unenforceable)
promises.”); Eric A. Posner, Antitrust and Labor Markets: A Reply to Richard Epstein, 15
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 389, 400 (2022) (“Employers are clearly not intimidated by the
law . . . .[N]oncompetes operate through an in terrorem effect. Only highly compensated
employees can afford lawyers to contest noncompetes in court, and so everyone else
doesn’t.”).
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A. States Take the Lead in the Fight Against Restrictive
Employment Agreements
Many states have limited the enforceability of restrictive employment
agreements, usually targeting non-compete agreements for low-wage
workers. 131 Since 2011, at least thirty-seven states have reviewed at their
noncompete laws, with twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia
making changes. 132 Three states—California, North Dakota, Oklahoma—
have enacted legislation deeming the use of employer-employee noncompete agreements per se illegal, unless they are connected to the sale of
a business. 133
Prior to 2021, seven states—Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Washington state—had enacted
legislation deeming the use of employer/employee non-compete
agreements per se illegal for low-wage workers. 134 In 2021, three more
states—Oregon, Nevada, and Illinois—joined this group. 135 Colorado is
set to be the eleventh state on August 10, 2022 and the District of
Columbia’s wage threshold is slated to take effect on October 1, 2022.136
Legislators in other states, such as Florida, Arkansas, Vermont,
Pennsylvania, and New Jersey have proposed bills banning non-compete

See Lewi et al., supra note 48; UNIF. RESTR. EMP. AGR. ACT 2, 5 (prefatory note).
See Russell Beck, What2Watch4: Two More Upcoming Noncompete Law Changes —
Colorado and D.C., FAIR COMP’N L. (Feb. 2, 2022), https://faircompetitionlaw.com/2022/
02/04/what2watch4-two-more-upcoming-noncompete-law-changes-colorado-and-d-c/;
Russell Beck, Curious Which States Have Changed Their Noncompete Laws in the Last
Decade? (More than Half), FAIR COMP’N L. (July 12, 2022), https://faircompetitionlaw.
com/2022/07/12/curious-which-states-have-changed-their-noncompete-laws-in-the-lastdecade-more-than-half/ (Russell Beck is a business, trade secrets, and employee mobility
litigator, nationally recognized for his trade secrets and noncompete experience).
133
See Lewi et al., supra note 48; UNIF. RESTR. EMP. AGR. ACT 3 (prefatory note).
134
Chris Marr, Employee Noncompete Clause Limits Adopted by Three More States,
BLOOMBERG L. (June 29, 2021, 5:30 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/employee-noncompete-clause-limits-adopted-by-three-more-states.
135
Id.; Russell Beck, Ours Goes to 11: Eleven States Now Have “Low-Wage” Worker
Thresholds, FAIR COMP’N L. (July 7, 2022), https://faircompetitionlaw.com/2022/07/
07/ours-goes-to-11-eleven-states-now-have-low-wage-worker-thresholds/ (“On August
10, 2022, Colorado will join the ranks of states prohibiting noncompetes for workers who
do not meet certain wage thresholds or related criteria . . . .Because of legislative cycles
and developments over the year, most of the 24 state bills involving low-wage workers this
year have died. However, as of [July 7, 2022], four more states are still considering lowwage thresholds. They are Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania.”).
136
Beck, supra note 135; Russell Beck, A Second Paradigm Shift in D.C.’s Noncompete
Law – No Longer a Ban, Now a Wage Threshold, FAIR COMP’N L. (July 15, 2022),
https://faircompetitionlaw.com/2022/07/15/a-second-paradigm-shift-in-d-c-s-noncompete
-law-no-longer-a-ban-now-a-wage-threshold/.
131
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agreements for most or all employees. 137 Montana law strongly disfavors
covenants not to compete, construing them in a light most favorable to the
employee and voiding agreements that completely restrain an employee’s
ability to work. 138
States also are enacting legislation allowing for civil penalties against
companies that use illegal or abusive non-compete agreements. 139 For
example, Illinois’ newly expanded Freedom to Work Act allows the
Illinois Attorney General to pursue enforcement action against employers
related to non-compete agreements and win civil penalties.140 On March
1, 2022, Colorado added criminal penalties to its existing non-compete
laws. 141 In some cases, states are making it easier for workers to win
attorney’s fees following disputes against employers who sought to
enforce illegal non-compete agreements. 142 Though states vary in their
approach, the legislative trend has been to allow for greater employee
mobility. 143

B. The Federal Government Encourages the Fight, But Remains
Somewhat Sidelined
Federal regulation of restrictive employment agreements has been
stipulated for years, but tangible legislation and/or agency rulemaking has
137
Tightening Restrictions on Noncompetes, MORRISON FOERSTER, https://elc.mofo.com
/topics/Tightening-Restrictions-on-Noncompetes.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2022).
138
Russell Beck, Montana Allows Noncompetes! (Only California, Oklahoma, and North
Dakota Don’t.), FAIR COMP’N L. (Jan. 30, 2021), https://faircompetitionlaw.com/2021/01/
30/montana-allows-noncompetes-only-california-oklahoma-and-north-dakota-dont/
(discussing Montana non-compete law and Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella,
Stevens, P.C., 265 P.3d 646 (Mont. 2011)).
139
Id.
140
Julie L. Gottshall, Illinois Enacts Restrictions on the Use of Non-Compete
Agreements: What Employers Need to Know, KATTEN (Aug. 30, 2021), https://katten.com/
Illinois-Enacts-Restrictions-on-the-Use-of-Non-Compete-Agreements-What-EmployersNeed-to-Know.
141
Colorado Adds Criminal Penalties to Unenforceable Non-Compete Agreements,
BAKER DONELSON (Mar. 3, 2022), https://www.bakerdonelson.com/colorado-addscriminal-penalties-to-unenforceable-non-compete-agreements; see Russell Beck, Eight
States with 39 Pending Noncompete Bills: Colorado is Changing its Noncompete Law –
Again, FAIR COMP’N L. (July 6, 2022), https://faircompetitionlaw.com/2022/07/06/8states-with-39-pending-noncompete-bills-colorado-is-changing-its-noncompete-lawagain/.
142
Marr, supra note 134 (citing Evan Starr); Janet A. Hendrick & Angela M. Buchanan,
Is This the End of Non-Compete Clauses in America?, PHILLIPS MURRAH, https://phillips
murrah.com/2021/08/is-this-the-end-of-non-compete-clauses-in-america/ (last visited
Aug. 1, 2022).
143
Amit Bindra, Recent Trends in Noncompete Laws Across the U.S., A.B.A. (May 29,
2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/employment-laborrelations/articles/2019/spring2019-recent-trends-in-noncompete-laws-across-the-us/.
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yet to materialize. 144 In March 2016, the U.S. Treasury Department issued
a report titled “Non-Compete Contracts: Economic Effects and Policy
Implications,” asserting pervasive misuse of non-compete agreements. 145
On April 15, 2016, President Obama issued Executive Order 13725: Steps
to Increase Competition and Better Inform Consumers and Workers to
Support Continued Growth of the American Economy, directing federal
agencies to promote competition and arm consumers and workers with
information. 146 The Order was followed by a May 2016 White House
report titled “Non-Compete Agreements: Analysis of the Usage, Potential
Issues, and State Responses,” decrying the use of employer/employee noncompete agreements and promising to identify avenues for reform. 147
In October 2016, President Obama issued a “State Call to Action on
Non-Compete Agreements,” echoing the sentiments of the Treasury
Department and White House reports. 148 “Best-practice policy objectives”
included banning noncompete agreements for certain categories of
workers, including low-income workers; improving transparency and
fairness by requiring that employers propose the agreement before
acceptance of a job offer or promotion; and incentivizing employers to
write enforceable contracts by eliminating the blue-pencil rule in favor of
the red-pencil rule. 149
The Call to Action influenced more than twenty states and the District
of Columbia to enact changes to their laws governing non-compete
agreements. 150 Later that month, the DOJ and FTC issued “Antitrust
Guidance for Human Resources Professionals,” ushering in a new era of
increased scrutiny by government regulators of non-compete clauses and
other labor market restrictions. 151 The Guidance outlined an aggressive
See Clifford Atlas et al., Takeaways from President Biden’s Executive Order on NonCompetes, JDSUPRA (July 16, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/takeaways-from
-president-biden-s-5602664/.
145
Id.; U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., supra note 102.
146
Clifford Atlas et al., White House Continues Attack on Non-Compete Agreements,
JACKSONLEWIS (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.jacksonlewis.com/publication/white-housecontinues-attack-non-compete-agreements.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
See State Call to Action on Non-Compete Agreements, THE WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 25,
2016) https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/competition/noncompetescalltoaction-final.pdf.
150
Atlas et al., supra note 144; see Beck, A Second Paradigm Shift in D.C.’s Noncompete
Law – No Longer a Ban, Now a Wage Threshold, supra note 136.
151
David J. Clark, Antitrust Action Against No-Poaching Agreements: Obama Policy to
Be Continued by the Trump Administration, EPSTEIN BECKER GREEN (Jan. 26, 2018),
https://www.tradesecretsandemployeemobility.com/2018/01/articles/non-competeagreements/antitrust-action-against-no-poaching-agreements-obama-policy-to-becontinued-by-the-trump-administration/; Michael E. Martinez et al., Competition in U.S.
144
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policy promising to investigate and punish employers, including Human
Resources employees, who enter into unlawful agreements concerning
recruitment or retention of employees. 152
Back in 2010, the FTC proposed settlements against Adobe Systems
Inc., Apple Inc., Google Inc., Intel Corp., Intuit Inc., Lucasfilm Ltd., and
Pixar for their use of anticompetitive no-poach agreements. 153 After a
drawn-out fight, Adobe, Apple, Google, and Intel eventually settled for
$415 million in 2015. 154 In the Call to Action, the DOJ announced its
intention to begin proceed criminally against “naked” no-poach
agreements because these “types of agreements eliminate competition in
the same irredeemable way as agreements to fix product prices or allocate
customers” and are “per se illegal under the antitrust laws.” 155 The Trump
Administration voiced support for the Obama-era policy. 156 In 2018, the
FTC had a handful of such criminal antitrust cases pending and issued a
“Spring Update” reiterating its position. 157
In September 2019, the DOJ held a public workshop to discuss the
role of antitrust enforcement in labor markets. 158 In November 2019,
nineteen State Attorneys General wrote a joint letter requesting that the
FTC use its “rulemaking authority to bring an end to the abusive use of
Labor Markets: Non-Compete Clauses Increasingly Under Fire, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Jan.
27, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/competition-us-labor-markets-noncompete-clauses-increasingly-under-fire.
152
Clark, supra note 151.
153
Justice Department Requires Lucasfilm to Stop Entering into Anticompetitive
Employee Solicitation Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Dec. 21, 2010), https://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-lucasfilm-stop-entering-anticompetitiveemployee-solicitation; Justice Department Requires Six High Tech Companies to Stop
Entering into Anticompetitive Employee Solicitation Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.
(Sept. 24, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-six-hightech-companies-stop-entering-anticompetitive-employee.
154
Jeff John Roberts, Tech Workers Will Get Average of $5,770 Under Final AntiPoaching Settlement, FORTUNE (Sept. 3, 2015), https://fortune.com/2015/09/03/koh-antipoach-order/.
155
Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & F.T.C.
(Oct. 16), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/903511/download (emphasis added).
156
Clark, supra note 151.
157
Gidley et al., supra note 75; No More No-Poach: The Antitrust Division Continues to
Investigate and Prosecute “No-Poach” and Wage-Fixing Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.
(Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations/division-update-spring2018/antitrust-division-continues-investigate-and-prosecute-no-poach-and-wage-fixingagreements.
158
US: DOJ to Hold Workshop on Competition in Labor Markets, COMP’N POL’Y INT’L
(Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/us-doj-to-hold-workshop
-on-competition-in-labor-markets/; Public Workshop on Competition in Labor Markets,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/atr/events/public-workshopcompetition-labor-markets.
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non-compete clauses in employment contracts.” 159 On January 9, 2020,
the FTC held a follow-up workshop focusing on the legal, economic, and
consumer protection issues associated with the use of employer/employee
non-compete agreements. 160
On July 9, 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order 14036:
Promoting Competition in the American Economy. 161 The Order began by
articulating the overarching policy consideration that a “fair, open, and
competitive marketplace has long been a cornerstone of the American
economy.” 162 The Order affirmed the Biden Administration’s commitment
to the principles behind the Sherman Act, promising to enforce antitrust
laws and address issues in labor markets. 163 The FTC, DOJ, Attorney
General, and other agencies were encouraged to enforce the Clayton Act
and the other antitrust laws “fairly and vigorously.” 164 The FTC in
particular was encouraged to curtail the unfair use of restrictive
employment agreements that may unfairly limit worker mobility through
its rulemaking authority under the Federal Trade Commission Act
(FTCA). 165
President Biden has expressed disdain for restrictive employment
agreements in the past. 166 While serving as Vice President to President
Obama in 2015, he bashed non-competes for depriving workers of the
freedom to find new jobs and negotiate higher wages. 167 In 2019, he
tweeted, “[w]e should get rid of non-compete clauses and no-poaching
Gidley et al., supra note 75.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 158; Non-Competes in the Workplace: Examining
Antitrust and Consumer Protection Issues, F.T.C. (Jan. 19, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/events-calendar/non-competes-workplace-examining-antitrust-consumerprotection-issues.
161
Exec. Order No. 14,036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36987 (July 9, 2021).
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.; see U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 62, at 2 (The Clayton Act, passed in 1914 and
significantly amended in 1950, prohibits mergers and acquisitions that are likely to harm
competition.)
165
Exec. Order No. 14,036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36987 (July 9, 2021); see F.T.C., supra note
69; see F.T.C. Act of 1914, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Federal_Trade_
Commission_Act_of_1914 (last visited Aug. 1, 2022) (The FTCA passed in 1914,
establishes the FTC. The five-member body was created to protect consumers by
preventing unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices. All
violations of the Sherman Act also violate the FTCA; thus, the FTC can bring case under
the FTCA against the same kinds of activities that violate the Sherman Act. The FTCA
also prohibits other practices that harm competition but do not fit neatly into categories of
conduct formally prohibited by the Sherman Act).
166
Sandeep Vaheesan, Biden Can Free Millions from Coercive Employment Contracts,
BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 5, 2021), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/bidencan-free-millions-from-coercive-employment-contracts.
167
Id.
159
160
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agreements that do nothing but suppress wages.” 168 He affirmed this
commitment as part of his 2020 presidential campaign, calling for the
elimination of “all non-compete agreements, except the very few that are
absolutely necessary to protect a narrowly defined category of trade
secrets.” 169 President Biden is the first ever president-elect to have
campaigned on a promise to limit restrictive employment agreements. 170
In March 2021, President Biden named Tim Wu a special assistant to
the president for technology and competition policy. 171 In June 2021,
President Biden appointed Lina Khan as the chair of the FTC. 172 In
November 2021, the Senate confirmed “Big-Tech Critic” Jonathan Kanter
to head the DOJ’s Antitrust Division. 173 The appointments of Khan,
Kanter, and Wu marked victories for the New Brandeis (a/k/a NeoBrandeis) movement. 174 The movement seeks to aggressively curb the
dominance of companies with “more muscular forms of antitrust policy”
and a “broad view of the harms caused by giant corporations, not just to
consumers but to rival companies, customers, suppliers and the larger
economy.” 175 In 2020, Khan criticized the FTC for failing to “play an
administrative, norm-creating role, instead opting to pursue antitrust
enforcement exclusively through adjudication.” 176 She has lamented the
fact that restrictive employment agreements are often not litigated to begin
with, due to contracts of dispossession such as mandatory arbitration
provisions or class action waivers. 177
168

Id.
Id.; The Biden Plan for Strengthening Worker Organizing, Collective Bargaining, and
Unions, https://joebiden.com/empowerworkers/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2022).
170
Chris Marr, As States Limit Noncompetes, D.C. on Verge of Outlawing Them,
BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 14, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/asstates-limit-noncompetes-d-c-on-verge-of-outlawing-them.
171
Cecilia Kang, A Leading Critic of Big Tech Will Join the White House, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/05/technology/tim-wu-white-house.
html.
172
David McCabe & Cecilia Kang, Biden Names Lina Khan, a Big-Tech Critic, as F.T.C.
Chair, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/15/technology/linakhan-ftc.html.
173
U.S. Senate Confirms Google Critic Kanter to Head Justice Dept Antitrust Division,
REUTERS (Nov. 16, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-senate-confirms-googlecritic-kanter-head-justice-dept-antitrust-division-2021-11-16/.
174
David Dayden & Alexander Sammon, The New Brandeis Movement Has Its Moment,
THE AM. PROSPECT (July 21, 2021), https://prospect.org/justice/new-brandeis-movementhas-its-moment-justice-department-antitrust-jonathan-kanter/.
175
Shannon Bond, New FTC Chair Lina Khan Wants to Redefine Monopoly Power for
the Age of Big Tech, NPR (July 1, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/07/01/1011907383/
new-ftc-chair-lina-khan-wants-to-redefine-monopoly-power-for-the-age-of-big-tech.
176
Lina M. Khan, The End of Antitrust History Revisited, COLUM. L. SCH. (2020), https://
scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2788/.
177
See Gidley et al., supra note 75.
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On October 27, 2021, the FTC and DOJ announced a two-day virtual
workshop titled “Making Competition Work: Promoting Competition in
Labor Markets,” to discuss efforts to promote competitive labor markets
and worker mobility. 178 The workshop took place on December 6 and 7,
2021, and Khan’s opening remarks outlined FTC-specific goals, including
scrutinizing non-compete agreements through rulemaking, enforcement,
and notice. 179 Panelists urged the agencies to follow the states’ leads and
limit the use of agreements, particularly among low-wage workers. 180
However, speakers from the Biden Administration focused on other
measures, such as regulating worker misclassification. 181 The keynote
address given by Wu did not mention non-compete agreements and the
workshop ended without any firm guidance on the President’s or the
agencies’ plans. 182
On January 18, 2022, the FTC and DOJ launched a joint public inquiry
focused on strengthening enforcement against illegal mergers. 183 The
agencies are devoting substantial resources into investigating and battling
Big-Tech giants such as Amazon, Apple Google, Microsoft, and
Facebook. 184 On March 7, 2022, the Treasury Department released “The
State of Labor Market Competition”, a sixty-eight-page report which,
among other things, discussed the heterogeneity in enforcement and
legality of restrictive employment agreements; the adverse effects of
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration and class action waivers; and the
barriers to mobility imposed by occupational licensing requirements. 185

178

FTC and DOJ to Hold Virtual Public Workshop Exploring Competition in Labor
Markets, F.T.C. (Oct. 27, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2021/10/
ftc-doj-hold-virtual-public-workshop-exploring-competition-labor.
179
Guy Brenner et al., FTC and DOJ Hold Workshop on Non-Compete Agreements,
PROSKAUER (Dec. 13, 2021), https://www.lawandtheworkplace.com/2021/12/ftc-and-dojhold-workshop-on-non-compete-agreements/.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Federal Trade Commission and Justice Department Seek to Strengthen Enforcement
Against Illegal Mergers, F.T.C. (Jan. 18, 2022), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2022/01/ftc-and-justice-department-seek-to-strengthen-enforcement-againstillegal-mergers.
184
Will Oremus, The Battle to Break up Big Tech Has Just Begun, WASH. POST (June 30,
2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/06/29/big-tech-breakup-battle/;
Clare Duffy, Microsoft’s Blockbuster Activision Blizzard Deal Could Raise Uncomfortable
Challenges for US Antitrust Enforcers, CNN (Feb. 18, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/
2022/02/18/tech/microsoft-activision-blizzard-ftc-antitrust/index.html.
185
The State of Labor Market Competition 1, 14-21, U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS. (Mar. 7,
2022), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/State-of-Labor-Market-Competition2022.pdf.
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Kanter’s keynote address at the University of Chicago Stigler Center
in April 2022 “declare[d] that the era of lax enforcement is over, and the
new era of vigorous and effective antitrust law enforcement ha[d]
begun.” 186 In June, Khan said that “[the FTC] fe[lt] an enormous amount
of urgency given how much harm [was] happening against . . .
workers.” 187 In July, Khan, on behalf of the FTC, signed a Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) with the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) regarding information sharing, cross-agency training, and
outreach in areas of common regulatory interest including “the imposition
of one-sided and restrictive contract provisions, such as noncompete and
nondisclosure provisions.” 188 The DOJ entered into similar MOUs with
the NLRB and Department of Labor in 2022. 189 Still, it has been over a
year since President Biden issued Executive Order 14036 and the agencies
have not taken any action on restrictive employment agreements. 190 Some
attribute a delay in agency rulemaking to a vacancy on the FTC’s fivemember body, as President Biden’s nomination of Alvaro Bedoya to the
empty seat remained pending for months. 191 He was eventually confirmed
as an FTC Commissioner on May 11, 2022. 192

Jonathan Kanter, Asst. Att’y Gen., Antitrust Enforcement: The Road to Recovery, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST. (Apr. 21, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorneygeneral-jonathan-kanter-delivers-keynote-university-chicago-stigler.
187
Dave Michaels & Ryan Tracy, FTC Considers Restricting the Use of Noncompete
Clauses by Companies, WALL ST. J. (June 9, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftcconsiders-restricting-the-use-of-noncompete-clauses-by-companies-11654747203.
188
Memorandum of Understanding Between the F.T.C. and the NLRB Regarding
Information Sharing, Cross-Agency Training, and Outreach in Areas of Common
Regulatory Interest, F.T.C. & NLRB (July 19, 2022), https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/
files/attachments/pages/node-7857/ftcnlrb-mou-71922.pdf.
189
Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of Justice and the
National Labor Relations Board, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & NLRB (July 26, 2022), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1522096/download; Departments of Justice and
Labor Strengthen Partnership to Protect Workers, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (Mar. 10, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/departmentsjustice-and-labor-strengthen-partnership-protect-workers.
190
Kate E. Gehl et al., One Year of Action Since President Biden’s Executive Order on
Competition, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (July 27, 2022), https://www.foley.com/en/insights/
publications/2022/07/1-year-president-biden-executive-order-competition.
191
See Erik W. Weibust, FTC Signals New Action on Noncompetes, NAT’L L. REV. (June
13, 2022), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/ftc-signals-new-action-noncompeteswill-people; FCC and FTC Nominations Delayed, ACA INT’L (Feb. 1, 2022), https://www.
acainternational.org/news/take-two-on-fcc-and-ftc-nominations/.
192
Arianna Evers et al., US Senate Confirms Alvaro Bedoya as FTC Commissioner,
JDSUPRA (May 24, 2022), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/us-senate-confirms-alvarobedoya-as-ftc-4066224/.
186

2022]

IN SUPPORT OF UREAA

143

Federal legislative efforts have continually fallen flat. 193 Three Senate
bills seeking to limit the use of non-compete agreements were introduced
in 2015, but none passed. 194 In 2018 and 2019, various other bills were
introduced, but none passed. 195 Still, federal legislative efforts have not
ceased. 196 Senator Murphy introduced another version of the Workforce
Mobility Act in February 2021. 197 An analogue bill, H.R. 1367, was
introduced in the House. 198 Finally, in July 2021, Senators Rubio and
Maggie Hassan reintroduced the Freedom to Compete Act. 199 These bills
and others remain pending as of August 1, 2022. 200

VI. THE NEED FOR TIMELY, UNIFORM, AND COMPREHENSIVE
ACTION AGAINST RESTRICTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS
The conventional employer justifications for restrictive employment
agreements ignore the availability of more effective, less restrictive
alternatives. 201 Employers can use intellectual and trade secret law to
protect their investments. 202 They can attract and retain talent through
See Russell Beck, Déjà Vu All Over Again: The Workforce Mobility Act Redux, FAIR
COMP’N. L. (Feb. 26, 2021), https://faircompetitionlaw.com/2021/02/26/deja-vu-all-overagain-the-workforce-mobility-act-redux/.
194
Id.
195
Id. (In 2018, Democratic Senators introduced the Workforce Mobility Act to impose
a federal ban on the use of employer/employee non-competes. House Representatives
introduced a companion bill, but that legislative session ended without action on either bill.
In 2019, Republican Senator Marco Rubio introduced the Freedom to Compete Act to
amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and ban non-competes for most non-exempt
workers. Later that year, Democrat and Republican Senators together introduced an
amended Workforce Mobility Act to ban the use of virtually all employee non-compete
agreements. Neither of these bills passed.)
196
See Beck, supra note 141.
197
Beck, supra note 193; Workforce Mobility Act of 2021, S.483, 117th Cong. (2021)
(available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/483?q=%7B%22
search%22%3A%5B%22noncompete%22%5D%7D&s=2&r=2).
198
Beck, supra note 141; Workforce Mobility Act of 2021, H.R. 1367, 117th Cong.
(2021) (available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1367/allinfo).
199
Russell Beck, A Brief History of Noncompete Regulation, FAIR COMP’N L. (Oct. 11,
2021),
https://faircompetitionlaw.com/2021/10/11/a-brief-history-of-noncompeteregulation/; Noncompete Laws: 2021 Year in Review, AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD
LLP (Jan. 13, 2022), https://www.akingump.com/a/web/q8oZeB1EXhFh1u9KDDN81C
/3yxJjf/labor-and-employment-alert.pdf.
200
See Beck, supra note 141.
201
See Sandeep Vaheesan, Testimony of Sandeep Vaheesan, Open Markets Institute,
Applauding SB 906 – An Act Concerning Non-Compete Agreements, OPEN MKTS. INST.
(Mar. 3, 2021), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5e449c8c3ef68d752f3e70dc/t/603fb
3f994021b58c3cea6fe/1614787578764/Vaheesan+testimony+re+SB+906.pdf.
202
Vaheesan & Buck, supra note 44, at 162.
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higher wages, bonuses, regular raises, promotions, skill development
programs, and flexible work arrangements. 203 These incentives and
opportunities should be tailored to individual employees’ preferences and
values. 204 Employers can also promote a culture of respect and loyalty by
improving work environments and addressing workplace hostility and
health threats. 205
Restrictive employment agreements are too often used as a weapon to
restrain trade and labor mobility, unreasonably depriving Americans of the
benefits of competition and hindering economic growth. 206 For a
restrictive employment agreement to be enforceable, the agreement must
reasonably protect a legitimate employer interest.207 An employer’s desire
to prevent a former employee from competing is not a legitimate interest,
especially when the worker is low-wage and unlikely to possess valuable
proprietary information. 208
Unions—collective bodies of workers who negotiate for higher wages
and benefits, improved workplace conditions, and opportunities for career
mobility, 209—could theoretically serve as a check on overbroad restrictive
employment agreements. 210 Collective bargaining for assurances such as
formal pay scales and firm job ladders raises wages and mobility for
unionized and non-unionized workers alike. 211 But there has been a
massive decline in union participation since the 1950s, coinciding with
slowed GDP growth, increased economic inequality, and a decline in
workers’ share of income. 212 And while 2021 was marked with many
strikes and efforts to organize, the trends of declining unionization and
worker power have persisted. 213
See supra Part II; Vaheesan, supra note 201.
Williamson, supra note 18; see supra Part II.
205
See Carosa, supra note 3, at D61.
206
Id.
207
See Vaheesan & Buck, supra note 44, at 120, 125-26; UNIF. RESTR. EMP. AGR. ACT 3
(prefatory note).
208
Id. at 4; See Carosa, supra note 3, at D5.
209
What Unions Do, AFL-CIO, https://aflcio.org/what-unions-do (last visited Aug. 1,
2022).
210
See Mark Theodore, Non-Compete Agreement a Mandatory Subject of Bargaining,
NLRB Rules, PROSKAUER (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.laborrelationsupdate.com/
uncategorized/non-compete-agreement-a-mandatory-subject-of-bargaining-nlrb-rules/.
211
See Michael A. Schultz, The Wage Mobility of Low-Wage Workers in a Changing
Economy, 1968 to 2014, 5 RUSSEL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCIS. 159, 162 (2019).
212
Posner, supra note 130, at 402.
213
Josh Eidelson, U.S. Labor’s Watershed Year Failed to Boost Union Memberships,
BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 20, 2022), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/u-slabors-watershed-year-failed-to-boost-union-memberships; see The Power of Workers,
NPR (July 24, 2020), https://www.npr.org/transcripts/895222963; see also Teddy Ostrow,
Labor Notes 2022: US Workers Are Pushing Unions into the Mainstream, DEUTSCHE
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Legislators and regulators must use the tools at their disposal to
confront the mismatch of power that currently exists between companies
and their employees. 214 Action against restrictive employment agreements
should be timely, uniform, and comprehensive.

A. Action Against Restrictive Employment Agreements Should Be
Timely
Action against restrictive employment agreements should be timely,
because these agreements stifle labor mobility at a time when it is greatly
needed. The pandemic and Great Resignation have completely
restructured the job market by disrupting jobs that are needed most, and
creating a skills mismatch between available workers and open jobs. 215
Existing trends in remote work and e-commerce are accelerating and
unspecialized, lower-paying jobs are most at risk for post-pandemic
obsolescence due to automation. 216 Altogether, up to twenty-five percent
more workers than previously estimated may need to switch occupations
and more than half of unemployed lower-wage workers may need to find
higher paying occupations to regain employment. 217 In other words, strong
economic recovery from COVID-19 hinges on occupational mobility. 218
Geographic mobility may also play an increasingly greater role in
labor markets. 219 If people continue to reject big-city life for more spacious
suburbs or smaller cities, employers in metropolitan areas might be forced
to open satellite work sites. 220 Most companies are expected to continue
allowing remote work post-pandemic, and those that don’t could find
themselves at risk of losing valued employees. 221 In 2021, ten percent of
jobs on LinkedIn and ZipRecruiter allowed workers to at least do some
work remotely, up from two percent in 2020 and those jobs got four times
WELLE (June 6, 2022), https://www.dw.com/en/labor-notes-2022-us-workers-are-pushingunions-into-the-mainstream/a-62216491 (noting increasing organized worker activity
through the first half of 2022, including those employed by Starbucks, Amazon, and
Apple—workplaces “previously considered unorganizable.”).
214
See NPR, supra note 213.
215
Winck & Kiersz, supra note 36.
216
See Thompson, supra note 6; Lund et al., supra note 37.
217
Lund et al., supra note 37.
218
Thompson, supra note 6.
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
Rani Molla, Remote Workers Are Moving Out of Big Cities — But Not to the Midwest,
VOX (July 5, 2021), https://www.vox.com/recode/22559081/remote-workers-movingcities-suburbs-middle-america-midwest; Laurel Wamsley, Workers Are Moving First,
Asking Questions Later. What Happens When Offices Reopen?, NPR (Mar. 9, 2021),
https://www.npr.org/2021/03/09/974862254/workers-are-moving-first-asking-questionslater-what-happens-when-offices-reopen.
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as many applications. 222 Remote workers should be free to move when
they desire a change of scenery, lower cost of living, or a more family
friendly environment. 223
Decisionmakers on both sides of the aisle increasingly turn to antitrust
mechanisms to combat corporate power and address a variety of economic
problems, from supply chain issues to inflation. 224 The heightened focus
on restrictive employment agreements reflects a growing recognition that
such agreements “prevent workers from earning what a competitive
market would dictate” and “stymie the natural labor market churn that
keeps the economy healthy.” 225 “Many courts have refused to uphold noncompetes against former employees who face a more difficult reemployment landscape than previously anticipated prior to COVID-19,
including employees in industries where the pandemic had . . . a
devastating impact.” 226 Public sentiment stands behind action against
unfair restraints of worker mobility and policymakers should strike while
the iron is hot. 227 Employees have become less happy, less productive, and
less engaged, accentuating the need for policies to promote labor
mobility. 228

B. Action Against Restrictive Employment Agreements Should Be
Uniform
Action against restrictive employment agreements should uniformly
address the current patchwork of state laws. 229 Homogenous restrictive
employment agreement laws benefits both employers and workers—both
of whom typically operate or will operate across state lines—by enhancing
clarity and predictability. 230 The assortment of state laws makes
Molla, supra note 221.
Wamsley, supra note 221.
224
See, e.g., Starr, supra note 117, at 14; Joe Weisenthal, Transcript: How Using
Antitrust Can Fight Inflation, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 13, 2022), https://news.
bloomberglaw.com/antitrust/transcript-how-using-antitrust-can-fight-inflation.
225
See Starr, supra note 117, at 14; see also Lobel, supra note 108, at 915 (“The
argument . . . for antitrust reform comes at a ripe time in which antitrust law is grappling
with changing markets and new ways in which companies gain dominance.”).
226
Ruofei Xiang, Enforcing Non-Compete Clauses in the Post-COVID Era, LAW.
MONTHLY (Mar. 2022), https://www.lawyer-monthly.com/2022/03/enforcing-noncompete-clauses-post-covid/.
227
See supra Part V.
228
See supra Part II.
229
See Starr, supra note 117, at 6, 14.
230
See Katie Robinson, ULC Approves Uniform Restrictive Employment Agreement Act,
UNIF. L. COMM’N (July 23, 2021), https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/communityhome/digestviewer/viewthread?MessageKey=ef54eaf7-88d8-4bba-8597-7bb794f99867;
Why Your State Should Adopt the Uniform Restrictive Employment Agreement Act (2021)
1, 1, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/Download
222
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compliance expensive for companies that operate in multiple states and
creates economic inefficiencies. 231 Interstate variations also make it
difficult for workers and potential entrepreneurs to know their rights and
obligations under a restrictive employment agreement. 232 Uniform action
against restrictive employment agreements is a logical approach to reform
that delivers strong benefits to employers, workers, entrepreneurs, and the
broader economy. 233

C. Action Against Restrictive Employment Agreements Should Be
Comprehensive
Action against restrictive employment agreements should be
comprehensive to prevent common abuses that restrain workers and
would-be entrepreneurs. 234 Many of the proposals put forth and state laws
passed thus far have focused largely on limiting enforcement of noncompete agreements. 235 These measures inadequately protect workers. 236
Evan Starr explains that lawmakers who wish to ban non-competes must
be ready to counter the potential anticompetitive effects of alternative
restrictive employment agreements, which can effectively bind workers to
firms. 237 In fact, recent policy movements focused on non-competes have
already influenced attorneys to advise firms to consider adopting
alternative arrangements. 238 Sandeep Vaheesan and Matthew Jinoo Buck
advocate for a comprehensive, “all-inclusive” solution which bans a range
of contracts of dispossession. 239
States’ use of the common law to regulate restrictive employment
agreements is not conducive for crafting strict notice requirements. 240 And
state legislation in this area has yet to include truly comprehensive notice
requirements. 241 Notice is critical for an effective and fair restrictive
employment agreement because advanced notice improves the workers’
bargaining position, allowing them to evaluate the agreement and
improving the likelihood that they will be happy, well compensated, and
DocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=7e370da2-2a5b-2d35-f7a5-599d66d87734&force
Dialog=0 (last visited Aug. 1, 2022).
231
Antitrust Federalism, Preemption, and Judge-Made Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 2557,
2561 (2020).
232
UNIF. RESTR. EMP. AGR. ACT 2 (prefatory note).
233
Id.
234
See Marr, supra note 170; see also Starr, supra note 99.
235
Marr, supra note 170.
236
See Starr, supra note 99.
237
Id.
238
Id.
239
Vaheesan & Buck, supra note 44, at 180.
240
UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 230, at 1.
241
Id.
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adequately trained. 242 John Lettieri, CEO of The Economic Innovation
Group, advocates for policies that require advance notice to job candidates
if they’ll be asked to sign a non-compete and employer payments of a
former employee’s partial or full salary while they’re subject to a noncompete (“garden leave”). 243
Finally, any law or rule curtailing restrictive employment agreements
must effectively deter their misuse and protect workers’ freedom to switch
jobs or to start their own businesses. 244 In blue-pencil jurisdictions,
employers can “free ride” on the chilling effects an overly broad restrictive
employment agreement with the knowledge that the court will simply
rewrite the agreement. 245 In red-pencil jurisdictions, an agreement found
to violate state law is often merely unenforceable, with no consequence to
the employer. 246

VII. EVERY STATE SHOULD ADOPT THE UNIFORM RESTRICTIVE
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT ACT
The Uniform Law Commission (“ULC” or “Commission”) is a
nonprofit that was formed in 1892 to create non-partisan state
legislation. 247 The ULC consists of volunteer commissioners
(practitioners, judges, law professors, legislative staff, etc.)—all of whom
are lawyers qualified to practice law.248 The commissioners are appointed
by state governments, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands to “research, draft, and promote enactment of uniform state
laws in areas where uniformity is desirable and practical.” 249 The
Commission has drafted more than three hundred laws designed to
decrease unnecessary conflicts.250
In response to the recent flurry in legislative activity surrounding
restrictive employment agreements, the ULC was inspired to propose the
Uniform Restrictive Employment Agreement Act (“UREAA” or the
See UNIF. RESTR. EMP. AGR. ACT § 4 cmt.; supra Part V.
Marr, supra note 170 (The Economic Innovation Group promotes policies that benefit
entrepreneurs, investors, and economic growth).
244
Vaheesan, supra note 201.
245
See supra Part V.
246
See UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 230, at 1; see also Lobel, supra note 108, at 931 (“If
reformation is the norm, ‘Employers would have no disincentive to use the broad, illegal
clauses if permitted to retreat to a narrow, lawful construction in the event of litigation’”)
(quoting Kolani v. Gluska, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 257, 260 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)).
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UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 230, at 1.
248
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“Act”). 251 Legislators in four states have introduced UREAA, but the Act
has yet to be adopted. 252 Every state should adopt UREAA because it is
timely, uniform, and comprehensive.

A. The Act is Timely
Critics broadly concur that the laws governing restrictive employment
agreements must be reformed. 253 Business-community and employeeadvocate groups are frustrated with the current patchwork of state laws
and employers are revising their agreements to better align with public
sentiment. 254 “[T]he rising tide of reform means this is one area of policy
that is almost certain to become friendlier to workers, more embracing of
competition, and more conducive to economic dynamism in the years
ahead.” 255 UREAA can introduce uniformity and comprehensiveness to
the current patchwork of state laws, without the need for time-consuming
federal legislative or regulatory approval. 256

B. The Act is Uniform
Surprise! The Uniform Restrictive Employment Agreement Act
provides a framework for uniform regulation of restrictive employment
agreements. 257 The Act was approved and recommended for enactment in
all fifty states. 258

C. The Act is Comprehensive
Currently, no state or federal law addresses restrictive employment
agreements en masse. 259 UREAA regulates all employer-employee
restrictive employment agreements,
including
non-competes,
confidentiality/non-disclosure agreements, non-solicitation agreements,
UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 230, at 1.
Russell Beck, Lots Going on: Noncompete Legislation, Regulation, and Case Law
Developments, FAIR COMP’N L. (June 27, 2022), https://faircompetitionlaw.com/2022/06/
27/lots-going-on-with-noncompete-legislation-regulation-and-case-law/
(Colorado,
Oklahoma, Vermont, and West Virginia); Beck, supra note 141 (Though Colorado’s
legislature indefinitely postponed consideration of UREAA, the legislature did pass
HB.22-1317, which makes sweeping changes to existing Colorado law, including the
establishment of low-wage thresholds, notice requirements, and a $5,000 penalty per
violation, effective August 10, 2022).
253
See UNIF. RESTR. EMP. AGR. ACT 2 (prefatory note).
254
See id.; supra Part V.
255
See UNIF. RESTR. EMP. AGR. ACT 2 (prefatory note).
256
See id.
257
UNIF. RESTR. EMP. AGR. ACT 1-2 (prefatory note).
258
UNIF. RESTR. EMP. AGR. ACT (title page).
259
See Starr, supra note 99.
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no-business agreements, no-recruit agreements, payment-for-competition
agreements, and training-repayment agreements. 260 The Act uses the term
“worker” to include employees, independent contractors, externs, interns,
volunteers, apprentices, and any other individuals providing services. 261 In
short, UREAA offers a comprehensive approach to reform that benefits
market participants and promotes competition. 262
The Act sets maximum durations for restrictive agreements ranging
from six months to five years and establishes other substantive
requirements for valid agreements. 263 UREAA’s requirements are
mandatory and cannot be waived, except under limited circumstances, to
protect the public interest in competition and mobility in labor markets. 264
The Act adopts commentators’ suggestions and the State Call to Action on
Non-Compete Agreements’ best-practice objectives by banning noncompete agreements for low-wage workers; providing for detailed notice
requirements that ensure workers understand what their restrictive
employment agreement prohibits; and eliminating the blue-pencil rule in
favor of two alternatives. 265
UREAA prohibits all restrictive employment agreements, except
confidentiality and training-reimbursement agreements for low-wage
workers, defined as those making less than the state’s annual mean
wage. 266 The Act also prohibits the enforcement of restrictive agreements
for workers that (1) resign for good cause attributable to their employer or
(2) are fired for a reason other than substantial misconduct or the
completion of the agreed work or employment term. 267
As explained above, state common law is a disfavored mechanism for
crafting strict notice requirements and has failed to do so. 268 UREAA
provides for detailed mechanisms to ensure that workers are aware of the
agreements in which they sign, and thus increases their bargaining
power. 269 The Act requires an employer to provide a prospective worker
See Robinson, supra note 230.
UNIF. RESTR. EMP. AGR. ACT § 2.
262
See id. 1-2 (prefatory note).
263
The Uniform Restrictive Employment Agreement Act (2021) -A Summary-, 1, 1, UNIF.
L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.
ashx?DocumentFileKey=b88a7f4c-00ee-4cc7-d586-83ba57220ded&forceDialog=0 (last
visited Aug. 1, 2022).
264
Id.
265
See supra Part V; UNIF. RESTR. EMP. AGR. ACT 1, 4 (prefatory note).
266
UNIF. RESTR. EMP. AGR. ACT 1 (prefatory note), § 5, § 5 cmt. (or some multiplier
thereof).
267
Id. § 6 (“A state should insert the term the state uses for determining major
disqualification for unemployment insurance benefits.” For example, instead of substantial
misconduct, a state may use the term gross misconduct or willful misconduct).
268
See supra Part V.
269
UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 230, at 1.
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with a copy of the proposed restrictive employment agreement at least
fourteen days before the worker accepts or commences work, whichever
is earlier. 270
The Act replaces the blue-pencil rule in favor of two alternatives. 271
Under Alternative A, a restrictive employment agreement that does not
comply with the Act is prohibited and unenforceable—essentially a redpencil rule. 272 Alternative B permits greater judicial discretion by allowing
a court to reform the agreement in certain circumstances if the employer
entered the agreement reasonably and in good faith thinking it was
enforceable. 273 The Act creates penalties to be enforced by private actors
in addition to state departments of labor, Attorneys General, or other state
officials. 274 Specifically, UREAA allows courts to award damages of up
to $5,000 per worker per illegal agreement for each violation. 275 This hefty
fine will deter the misuse of restrictive employment agreements and
promote worker mobility. 276

D. Lingering Issues: Truly Comprehensive & Uniform? Too
Employer-Friendly? Not Strict Enough? Redundant?
Of course, no piece of legislation is perfect, and the Act is not without
its flaws. Though the array of covered agreements is broader than noncompetes, the definition of restrictive employment agreement is inherently
limiting, covering only post-work activity. 277 For example, the Act does
not cover an agreement between an employer and worker about current
working conditions. 278 UREAA does not cover employer-employer nopoach agreements, which restrain trade and depress wages. 279 The Act also
does not cover certain alternative arrangements, or institutional barriers to
worker mobility, such as occupational licensing and educational
requirements. 280 Furthermore, UREAA defers regulation of confidentiality
agreements to state whistleblower and sexual harassment statutes. 281 The
Commission believes that confidentiality is a “major requirement for any
UNIF. RESTR. EMP. AGR. ACT § 4.
See id. § 16, § 16 cmt.
272
See id.
273
See id.
274
See id.
275
See id. § 16, § 16 cmt.
276
See Vaheesan, supra note 201.
277
UNIF. RESTR. EMP. AGR. ACT § 2 cmt.
278
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279
Id.; see Starr, supra note 99.
280
Adam A. Millsap, Occupational Licensing Linked to Less Economic Mobility, FORBES
(Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adammillsap/2018/04/11/occupationallicensing-linked-to-less-economic-mobility/?sh=470ddab67732; Hayes, supra note 7.
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worker,” and that “an appropriate confidentiality agreement does not
greatly restrict mobility.” 282 Because each state has different annual mean
wages, the threshold at which a worker is considered low-wage will vary
among jurisdictions, marginally preserving the patchwork of state laws. 283
Declining to condemn training-reimbursement agreements as per se
illegal, the Commission strikes a balance that some may find too
employer-friendly: an employer can require repayment up to the actual
cost of “special training,” as long as the worker worked for the employee
for two years or less after receiving the training. 284 Additionally,
UREAA’s Saving Provision delays the full applicability of the Act,
exempting agreements entered into before an effective date.285 The
Commission acknowledges that the Savings Provision might incentivize
employers to lock employees into a soon-to-be prohibited agreement, but
counteracts these concerns with a Transitional Provision that allows state
legislatures to enforce certain provisions immediately. 286
UREAA doesn’t go as far as some states have gone in classifying noncompetes per se illegal for all employees, which is problematic because
restrictive employment agreements are anti-competitive at any income
level. 287 Critics have claimed that legislation or regulatory action against
restrictive employment agreements is unnecessary, as courts satisfactorily
judge the reasonableness of restrictive covenants on a case-by-case
basis. 288
In reality, restrictive employment agreements are rarely challenged by
low-wage workers, and a pro-employee ruling is, at most, a minimal
Id. § 5 cmt.
Id.; Dawn Mertineit, More States Eye Low-Wage Non-Compete Bans n.1, JDSUPRA
(Mar. 8, 2022), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/more-states-eye-low-wage-noncompete-8055571/; see generally Weibust, supra note 191 (arguing that regulation of noncompetes should be left to the states but recognizing the practical disadvantages of a stateby-state approach).
284
UNIF. RESTR. EMP. AGR. ACT § 14 cmt.
285
Id. § 19, § 19 cmt.
286
See id. § 19, § 19 cmt., § 20.
287
See supra Part V; Marr, supra note 170; Lobel, supra note 105 (“While some
proposals on prohibiting noncompete policies have focused on the lower-skilled labor
market, these efforts miss the bigger picture. The reason to ban noncompetes isn’t simply
to protect the ability of low-income workers to make a living in low-skill jobs. Rather, a
ban on noncompetes is designed to enrich the talent pool at all levels of the labor market
and to fuel healthy competition for skilled, as well as unskilled, talent.”).
288
Mark S. Goldstein & Noah S. Oberlander, What Does the Future Hold for Restrictive
Covenant Agreements in the U.S.?, REUTERS (Oct. 1, 2021, 10:53 AM), https://www.
reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/what-does-future-hold-restrictive-covenant-agreementsus-2021-10-01/; Posner, supra note 130, at 398 (“Epstein . . . argues that . . . antitrust
litigation aimed at covenants not to compete is unnecessary because common law
regulation is sufficient.”).
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inconvenience for the employer. 289 In the antitrust context, once the rule
of reason has been adopted, antitrust claims are very difficult to prove,
requiring “an individualized factual inquiry into [a restraint’s] nature,
purpose, circumstances, and history.” 290 The rule of reason analysis
determines the effect of a particular restraint’s effect on the relevant
geographic and product market, rather than the effect on the parties
themselves. 291 One study found that ninety-seven percent of cases
analyzed under the rule of reason framework were dismissed due to the
plaintiff’s inability to show an anticompetitive effect.292
Existing common law and antitrust approaches have been insufficient,
as evidenced by the proliferation of restrictive covenants and their adverse
effects on employees. 293 The abuse of restrictive employment agreements
to restrain low-wage workers is especially egregious and unjustified—
worthy of special protection, lest the abuse go unpunished—and the Act is
consistent with state trends in addressing this issue. 294 Ten states have
introduced or amended their low-wage worker thresholds since 2016, with
Colorado and the District of Columbia coming down the pipeline. 295 Of
the first one-hundred non-compete laws introduced across twenty-nine
states and the District of Columbia in 2022, five involved proposed bans,
twenty-four involved low-wage worker thresholds, twenty-one involved
notice provisions, and sixteen included fines for violations. 296 While the

See supra Part V; Posner, supra note 130, at 399 (“[C]ommon law regulation varies
across states, and in some states it is quite light . . . .[C]ommon law sanction is exceedingly
weak—nonenforcement, while in some states courts will merely whittle down an
overbroad noncompete to an acceptable size.”).
290
Lobel, supra note 108, at 911.
291
PRACTICAL L. ANTITRUST, supra note 50.
292
Id.; Lobel, supra note 108, at 911-13 (“In practice, when an individual challenges a
noncompete absent a class action, it is difficult to prove market impact of the single
noncompete[,] . . . [which] allows employers to increase their market power over the labor
force and further suppress wages.”).
293
See Posner, supra note 130, at 399 (“[C]ommon law regulation does not address
market-wide impacts as antitrust law does, and so will tolerate noncompete agreements
that cartelize labor markets but that do not cause significant harm to the worker in
question.”); Eric A. Posner, The Antitrust Challenge to Covenants Not to Compete in
Employment Contracts, 83 ANTITRUST L. J. 165, 200 (2020) (“[N]ew evidence, including
the new research about labor market concentration, the evidence of wage stagnation, and
the legacy of failed antitrust enforcement against labor monopsonists suggest that courts
have failed to give noncompetes sufficient scrutiny.”); UNIF. RESTR. EMP. AGR. ACT § 3
cmt.
294
See supra Part V.
295
See supra Part IV.
296
Beck, supra note 141; Russell Beck, Noncompete Notice Requirements — Updated
for D.C.’s Anticipated Amendment, FAIR COMP’N L. (Aug. 17, 2022), https://fair
competitionlaw.com/2022/07/18/noncompete-notice-requirements-updated-for-d-c-s289
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Act does not enact a blanket ban, it protects a substantial fraction of the
labor force from restrictive employment agreements and is a step in the
right direction. 297

E. The Act Leaves Room for Congress and Federal Agencies to
Guide Enforcement
If President Biden wants to make good on his promise to limit
restrictive employment agreements, federal rulemaking or legislation are
two paths to real change. 298 To his credit, he has made a host of agency
appointments that have been well-received by advocates for reform. 299 His
willingness to unleash non-legislative power to tangle with the largest
forces in our economy may prove to be one of the defining achievements
of his presidential tenure. 300
An FTC rule curtailing restrictive employment agreements would be
consistent with the agency’s goal of preventing unfair methods of
competition, as well as recent state action. 301 FTC rulemaking would also
be consistent with the ideals of the Neo-Brandeis movement, which seeks
to use antitrust mechanisms to address a wide range of anticompetitive
practices. 302 Executive Order 14036 gives the FTC a green light to do what
Lina Khan has been advocating for in academic publications. 303 The
agency can play an administrative, norm-creating role to broadly shape the
law of restrictive employment agreements, rather than pursuing challenges
exclusively through adjudication. 304 Rulemaking would also give notice to
a much larger set of employers and employees than ad hoc adjudication. 305
Of course, any federal action would be uniform in its application and
scope. 306
Federal action against restrictive employment agreements has not
exactly been timely, though that could change. Traditionally, federal
anticipated-amendment/ (By the end of 2022, at least eight states will have advance notice
requirements in effect).
297
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298
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299
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300
Dayden & Sammon, supra note 174.
301
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302
Gidley et al., supra note 75.
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See id. But see Jessica Mach, Labor of Law: Federal Noncompete Ban Would Be Far
from Last Word on Issue, LAW.COM (July 28, 2022, 10:44 AM), https://www.law.com/
2022/07/28/labor-of-law-federal-noncompete-ban-would-be-far-from-last-word-on-issue/
(“Even if the rule passes muster, the extent to which the FTC will try—or have the
resources—to enforce it nationwide also will determine how effective it is.”).
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agencies take months or years to complete the rulemaking process and
resolve any legal challenges. 307 However, in July 2021, the FTC approved
changes to its Rules of Practice, eliminating internal hurdles to rulemaking
and strengthening the agency’s ability to challenge unfair and deceptive
practices under the FTCA. 308 And FTC Commissioners have recognized
that rulemaking can effectuate changes in the legal landscape faster than
legislation, even if federal regulations do not necessarily carry the same
force of law as Congressional legislation. 309
Still, the FTC and DOJ remain preoccupied grappling with Big-Tech
giants, illegal mergers, and other issues, such as worker
misclassification. 310 Commissioner Noah Phillips has suggested that the
FTC lacks authority to promulgate a rule restricting the use of
employer/employee non-compete agreements, a view that may find
support in the Supreme Court’s ruling in West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct.
2587 (2022). 311
Congress has been unable to agree on the details of reform,
notwithstanding years of bipartisan proposals in both the House and
Senate, though bills continue to be introduced. 312 Despite all the posturing,
neither tangible federal legislation nor agency rulemaking against
restrictive employment agreements has come to fruition.
With or without new regulation, the FTC and DOJ should devote more
resources to scrutinizing restrictive employment agreements and
alternative arrangements and/or expand the circumstances under which
these arrangements are considered to unreasonably restrain trade. 313 The
agencies should also revise the Joint Antitrust Guidelines for Human
Resources Professionals to reflect any change in enforcement policies and
laws. 314
Again, the importance of comprehensive action cannot be overstated.
If the agencies or Congress ban non-compete agreements for some or all
Mark S. Goldstein et al., What’s All this Talk About Federal Regulation of NonCompete Agreements?, REED SMITH (July 19, 2021), https://www.employmentlawwatch.
com/2021/07/articles/employment-us/whats-all-this-talk-about-federal-regulation-of-noncompete-agreements/.
308
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310
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EPA Ruling, LAW360 (July 14, 2022, 6:29 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles
/1511340/ftc-authority-to-ban-noncompetes-shaky-after-epa-ruling; Mach, supra note
306.
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See id.; Goldstein & Oberlander, supra note 288 (“The guidelines currently state that
they do ‘not address the legality of specific terms contained in contracts between an
employer and an employee, including non-compete clauses.’”).
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workers, but leave other restrictive employment agreements untouched,
firms will resort towards these substitutes, and the negative effects on
labor and product market competition will persist.315 Workers must be
made aware that their restrictive employment agreements are
unenforceable to avoid the chilling effect on employee mobility. 316
Moreover, employers must be held accountable through aggressive
enforcement and penalties. 317
UREAA falls short of regulating no-poach agreements, which is an
area where the federal government can step in.318 In January 2021, the DOJ
Antitrust Division filed its first criminal antitrust prosecution against a
healthcare provider for its use of no-poach agreements. 319 Six months
later, the DOJ achieved two more indictments against two alleged coconspirators in the same investigation. 320 On January 28, 2022, a federal
district court endorsed for the first time the DOJ’s view that no-poach
agreements can constitute criminal antitrust violations.321 State Attorneys
Generals and private actors have been active in the fight against no-poach
agreements, but it would be nice to see the agencies answer the Attorneys
Generals’ call for additional federal support. 322

VIII. CONCLUSION: FEDERALISM “AT WORK”
“While many lawyers and judges describe contract law as ‘private
law,’ it is dependent on state power for its force and legitimacy and so
unavoidably implicates public policy.” 323 Public policy considerations
weigh in favor of an individual’s right to pursue a new job without
hindrance. 324 There are signs of growing public and bipartisan support for
limiting the use of restrictive employment agreements, both at the state
and federal level. 325 Oversight and enforcement of restrictive employee
agreements has traditionally been left to the states. 326 Many states have
315
316
317
318
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limited the enforceability of such agreements and ramped up penalties for
noncompliance, and many more seem poised to do so in the near future. 327
But legislation has been neither timely, nor uniform, nor comprehensive,
and fails to provide adequate notice to market participants. 328
UREAA addresses all restrictive employment agreements, including
topics such as the extent to which such agreements are enforceable; notice
and other procedural requirements; enforceability standards; choice of law
issues; and remedies. 329 It is consistent with state enforcement trends and
protects particularly vulnerable low-wage workers from unreasonable
restraints on their mobility.330 Every state should adopt UREAA because
the Act is timely, uniform, and comprehensive.
Although Executive Order 14036 breaks with historical tradition by
encouraging federal involvement, this approach aligns with the NeoBrandeis antitrust school of thought that is quickly gaining momentum
(and representation) in the Biden Administration. 331 The Order provides a
clear message from the Biden Administration to the federal government:
join the states’ fight against restrictive employment agreements.332 Neither
Congress nor the agencies have taken up the task quite yet. 333
Will states be permitted to continue adopting laws regulating
restrictive employment agreements on an ad hoc basis? 334 Will the federal
government finally step into the fray and force a one-size-fits-all
approach? 335 The options are not mutually exclusive. Federal and state
efforts to curtail the use of restrictive employment agreements can coexist.
Take trade secret law as an example. Forty-eight states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands have adopted the ULC’s
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) since it was first promulgated in
1979. 336 By enacting UTSA, states codified the basic principles of
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common law trade secret protection to clarify and standardize the law.337
UTSA did not lead to an entirely “uniform” set of laws, as many states
adopted their own variations which courts have uniquely interpreted. 338
So, in 2016, Congress supplemented state trade secret laws by enacting the
Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) to address the patchwork of state
trade secret laws and enhance uniformity.339 DTSA provides a single,
national standard for trade secret misappropriation, but doesn’t preempt
state laws (such as UTSA), providing overlapping causes of action. 340 In
similar fashion, states should adopt UREAA to address often-abused
restrictive employment agreements in the short term, while the federal
government should address any gaps in uniformity or efficacy in the long
term.

Uniform Law Commissioners contend that Alabama has adopted it, while North Carolina
has not; I view the results as largely the opposite.”) (internal parentheses omitted).
337
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